نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، پردیس خواهران دانشگاه امام صادق علیه السلام، تهران، ایران
2 عضو هیئت علمی گروه فلسفه دانشگاه خوارزمی تهران
3 استادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه خوارزمی، تهران، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The problem of evil poses a significant challenge for monotheistic religions: If God possesses infinite knowledge, absolute power, and perfect goodness, why does He permit evil in creation? Process theologians attempt to resolve this by denying divine omnipotence, foreknowledge, and complete agency. They argue that while God is the most powerful being, He is not omnipotent. God's role is limited to providing possibilities and guiding creatures toward order, harmony, and divine ends. However, creatures, through their own creativity and free will, choose their paths, and God cannot compel them toward harmony. If their choices deviate from divine guidance, natural evils and disorder arise. Thus, God is not responsible for natural evils, and their existence does not contradict His goodness. In contrast, Mullā Ṣadrā, affirming divine foreknowledge and omnipotence, defends God's manifestational agency (fi‘liyyat bil-tajallī), arguing that natural evils do not conflict with divine goodness or power. He maintains that existence is the sole object of divine creation, whereas evils—being privative (‘adami)—are not directly willed by God. Moreover, he asserts that natural evils are inherent to the material world; their elimination would either entail a logical contradiction or require the nonexistence of the natural order itself. Thus, natural evils are necessary concomitants of material existence and do not undermine God's absolute agency or essential necessity. This paper employs a critical-analytical method to evaluate process theology’s internal inconsistencies and contrast them with Ṣadrian metaphysics, concluding that Ṣadrā’s solution remains philosophically coherent within his framework.
کلیدواژهها [English]