نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه تطبیقی دانشگاه قم
2 استاد تمام گروه فلسفه و کلام دانشگاه قم
3 استاد تمام گروه فلسفه اخلاق دانشگاه قم
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Philosophers of the mind, based on various approaches to the problem of the mind, have proposed different criteria about human personality, "person" or "I". One of these criteria is having a first-person perspective. One of the proponents of this criteria is Lynne Rudder Baker, a non-reductionist materialist philosopher who considers human personality neither as an immaterial soul nor as reducing it over to physical things. According to her, a robust first-person perspective is sufficient and necessary condition for being a person. A being is a person if and only if it has the capacity for a first-person perspective. The robust first-person perspective is the ability to conceive of oneself as oneself, without the use of any name or description. It is same self-consciousness that distinguishes a person from other beings. In contrast, there is a rudimentary first-person perspective, which is specific to beings who, despite having consciousness, lack the self-consciousness feature. The present article has evaluated and criticized the Baker's point of view on first-person perspective with analytical and critical methodology. Ambiguity in the nature of the first-person perspective and being a person, an absence of argument for some claims and lack adequately clarity on some preconditions and presuppositions are some criticisms that were propounded on the acceptability and coherence of Baker's view.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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