ناسازگاری هستی و زمان در نظریۀ حال باوری

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفۀ تطبیقی، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران

2 استادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشکدۀ الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران

10.22061/orj.2019.1588

چکیده

از جمله نظریاتی که در رابطۀ زمان و وجود مطرح است، نظریۀ ­حال­باوری است. حال­باوران معتقدند که اولاً تنها اشیائی که در زمان حال قرار دارند؛ موجودند و سایر اشیاء موجود نیستند. ثانیاً موجودیّت اشیاء مطلق و نامقیّد است. آن­ها نظریات رقیب مانند جاودانگی، امکان­باوری و آینده­ممنوع را در این رابطه به چالش می­کشند. حال­باوران برای واقعیت داشتن همه هویّات وجودی نظیر سقراط که در گذشته بوده و سال 3000 که در آینده خواهد بود، توجیه مناسبی ندارند. هم­چنین، وفق حال­باوری نمی­توان از ارتباط برخی هویّات غیرزمان­مند مانند «آبراهام لینکن بلندتر از ناپلئون بناپارت است.» و صدق­سازهای آن­ها سخن گفت. از این­رو، در این نوشتار، به روش تحلیل فلسفی با تأکید بر رابطۀ زمان و وجود نخست؛ براهین حال­باوران که شامل شهود، تجربه، پیش­بینی، تیغِ­اکام و نسبیت­گرایی است، استخراج شده با بازسازی براهین مخالفین نشان داده شده است که حال­باوران با وجود مفهوم­سازی­ جدید از زمان مطلق و طرح حال­باوری بدیل که قائل به نوعی زمانِ­ مطلق از نوع (B-theory) است و فروکاستن حال­باوری قوی به نوع ضعیف آن، به­دلیل گذرا­بودنِ زمان، عدول از اصول اولیّه خود در باور به زمان از نوع (A-theory)  و قائل بودن به وجود هویّات غیرزمان­مند از جمله کلیّات در حل مسئلۀ تغییر در ارتباط با نسبت­های موقّت زمانی، ارجاع گزاره­ای و صدق­سازها ناکام مانده ­اند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

An Inconsistency between Being and Time in Presentism

نویسندگان [English]

  • Sakineh Karimi 1
  • Mahdi Monfared 2
1 Ph.D. Student in Comparative Philosophy, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
2 Assistant Professor Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of theologies and Islamic learnings, University of Qom, Qom Iran
چکیده [English]

Presentists argue that only present entities exist absolutely and unrestrictedly. Presentism, which itself is a temporal analog of the modal doctrine of actualism, is an ontological idea about time and existence against theories such as eternalism, possibilism, and growing block theory. Thus, presentists deny the existence of atemporal or timeless entities and describe presentism as a version of the (A-theory), which makes a difference between present, past, and future. Also presentists are not able to ontologically, justify the existence of some entities such as Socrates and the year 3000 in the past and the future and the relations involving non-present objects like ‘Abraham Lincoln was taller than Napoleon Bonaparte’. However, presentism is altered via the addition of an abstract four-dimensional manifold of ersatz time, which is a type of (B-theory) series, to identify all ontological entities and justify the dynamic world. This inquiry is an attempt to put a completely different perspective on presentism and, the result obtained that despite the new conceptualization of time, there is an inconsistency between time and being in presentism. Therefore, presentists have failed to determine the ontological identification of cross-temporal relations, reference and propositions, and truth-makers. Also, whatever the final outcome of the debate between presentism and other views significantly eternalism, according to ersatz presentism, it is hard to make sense of the idea that things change from one moment to the next.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Presentism
  • Time
  • Existence
  • Eternalism

مراجع

Adams, Robert Merrihew. Actualism and Thisness: Synthese. 1981; 49(1).
–––. Time and Thisness. Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 1986; 11.
Armstrong, D.M. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2004. 
Bergmann, Michael. (Serious) Actualism and (Serious) Presentism. Noûs. 1999; 33(1).
Bigelow, John. Presentism and Properties. Philosophical Perspectives. 1996; 10.
Bourne, Craig. a Future for Presentism, Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006.
Crisp, Thomas M. Presentism in Loux & Zimmerman (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics; Oxford University Press; 2003.
–––. On Presentism and Triviality & Reply to Ludlow in Zimmerman (ed.). Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vol. 1. 2004; 15–20 & 37–46.
–––. Presentism and ‘Cross-Time’, Relations.  American Philosophical Quarterly. 2005; 42(1).
Davidson, Matthew. Direct Reference and Singular Propositions. American Philosophical Quarterly. 2000; 37(3).
Deasy, Daniel. What is Presentism.  Noûs. 2017; 51(2).
Honnefelder, L & Runggaldier, E, Schick. B. Unity and Time in Metaphysics. Walter de Gruyter and Berlin: New York; 2009. 
Hestevold, H. Scott & William R. Carter. On Presentism. Endurance, and Change. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2002.
Hinchliff, Mark. The Puzzle of Change. Philosophical Perspectives. 1996; 10.
Ingram, David. The Virtues of Thisness Presentism. Philosophical Studies. 2016; 173(11).
–––, & Tallant, Jonathan. Presentism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL=<https, //plato.stanford.edu/presentism/>. 2018.
Lewis, David. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell;1973.
Lloyd, G. Time and Existence. Philosophy. Vol 53, No 204, Cambridge University Press; 1978.
King, Jeffrey C. the Nature and Structure of Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2007.
Leininger, Lisa. Presentism and the Myth of Passage.  Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 2015; 93(4).
Markosian, Ned. A Defense of Presentism. In Dean Zimmerman (ed.). Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1. Oxford University Press; 2004.
–––. Time. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL = <https://plato.stanford.edutime. />   2016.
McDaniel Kris. John M. E. McTaggart. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N.Zalta(ed.). forthcomingURL=<https://plato.stanford.edu/ />. .2020.
Merricks, Trenton. Singular Propositions. in Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind. New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2012. 
Meyer, Ulrich. The Presentist’s Dilemma. Philosophical Studies. 2005. 122(3).
Miller, Kristie. Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block. in A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Heather Dyke & Adrian Bardon (eds). Oxford: Blackwell; 2013.
Nelson, Michael. Existence. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu />. 2019.
Noonan, Harold W. Presentism and Eternalism. Erkenntnis. 2013; 73(1).
Price, Huw. The Flow of Time. in Callender. 2011.
Sider, Theodore. Presentism and Ontological Commitment. the Journal of Philosophy. 1999; 96(7).
–––. Four-Dimensionalism. An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford. Oxford University Press; 2001.
Tallant, Jonathan. Defining Existence Presentism. Erkenntnis. 2014; 79(3).
–––, & David Ingram. Presentism and Distributional Properties. in Bennett & Zimmerman. In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.). Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.Vol. 7. Oxford University Press; 2012. pp. 305-314.
Williamson, Timothy. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2013.
–––. Necessary Existents. in Logic, Thought and Language. Anthony O’Hear (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2002. 
Zimmerman, Dean W. Temporary Intrinsic and Presentism. in Metaphysics. The Big Questions. Oxford: Blackwell; 1998.
–––. The A-theory of Time, the B-theory of Time, and 'Taking Tense Seriously'. Dialectica. 2005; N. 59.

فایل ها

هم رسانی

ارجاع به این مقاله

آمار