Mulla Sadra's Attempt to Solve Two Antinomies in the Metaphysics of Motion

Articles in Press

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Ph.D. Candidate in Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Iran.

2 Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Iran.  

10.22061/orj.2025.12052.893

Abstract

The current paper, using a descriptive and critical analysis method, seeks to examine Mulla Sadra's attempt to respond to two antinomies concerning motion. The first antinomy, which is considered by antinomy-believers as an a posteriori reason for the realization of contradiction, by focusing on the issue of motion, intends to express that existence and non-existence in the subject of motion become contradictorily intermingled. The second antinomy, which is in fact a challenge between Avicenna and Sadra—although it does not lead to antinomy-belief—by analyzing the issue of time, seeks to question the very existence of motion as an external reality. The examination of Mulla Sadra's works indicates that regarding the first antinomy, by adhering to the various aspects of non-existence and not considering a specific اعتبار (e'tebar - consideration) of it as being opposed to existence, he has set forth a way to answer this enigma and has extricated this problem from the antinomy-believing impasse, and concerning the second antinomy, by explaining his specific view of two meanings of motion (tavassoti and ghat'i - intermediate and decisive) and accepting motion in the sense of ghat' as an external reality that is continuous and gradually occurring, he has answered the question. Overall, Sadra has attempted, by providing rational preliminaries, to clear his philosophy of contradiction in both cases.

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Journal of Ontological Researches

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 17 November 2025

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