The Robust First-Person Perspective: the Criterion of Human Personality from the Lynne Rudder Baker's Point of View

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD student of comparative philosophy, University of Qom, Qom, Iran

2 Professor of Comparative Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Islamic Theology, University of Qom, Qom, Iran

3 Professor of Philosophy, Department of Ethics, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.

10.22061/orj.2023.1839

Abstract

Philosophers of the mind, based on various approaches to the problem of the mind, have proposed different criteria about human personality, "person" or "I". One of these criteria is having a first-person perspective. One of the proponents of this criteria is Lynne Rudder Baker, a non-reductionist materialist philosopher who considers human personality neither as an immaterial soul nor as reducing it over to physical things. According to her, a robust first-person perspective is sufficient and necessary condition for being a person. A being is a person if and only if it has the capacity for a first-person perspective. The robust first-person perspective is the ability to conceive of oneself as oneself, without the use of any name or description. It is same self-consciousness that distinguishes a person from other beings. In contrast, there is a rudimentary first-person perspective, which is specific to beings who, despite having consciousness, lack the self-consciousness feature. The present article has evaluated and criticized the Baker's point of view on first-person perspective with analytical and critical methodology. Ambiguity in the nature of the first-person perspective and being a person, an absence of argument for some claims and lack adequately clarity on some preconditions and presuppositions are some criticisms that were propounded ‌on the acceptability and coherence of Baker's view.

Keywords

Journal of Ontological Researches
Volume 11, Issue 22
February 2023

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