Considerations on David Armstrong's Naturalistic Theory of Universals

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Associate professor of Islamic philosophy and theosophy, Imam Khomeini international university

2 PhD candidate of Islamic philosophy and wisdom, Imam Khomeini international university

Abstract

According to a metaphysical classification, there are two different things; particulars and universals. That which is meant by Particulars is separated and exclusive things, that is, individuals who cannot be repeatable. For example, each of us is a particular human being. Among the particulars we find some similarities which make those particulars to be classified. Every particular has some common properties and relations with the others. These common properties and relations have led to a problem called "the problem of universals”. The main question on universals is whether they are real or just a linguistic term made by human beings. Realism, Nominalism and conceptualism are the three main theories on the Universals. David Armstrong, a contemporary naturalist philosopher has introduced a new theory on universals called Scientific Realism. He, by using the term as a state of affairs in his ontology, considers particularity and universality as two sides of a state of affairs. In this paper his theory on universals will be taken into consideration.

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References

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Journal of Ontological Researches
Volume 6, Issue 11
September 2017
Pages 45-62

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