The Ontology of Events; A Critical Analysis of Davidson’s Argument

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Tarbiat Modarres

Abstract

Events are things that occur or happen. Although it is just in the contemporary metaphysics that the philosophical debate on events has become prominent, its initial origins could be found in the ancient philosophy as the issues of motion and of the Aristotelian categories of action and affection. The main recent debates concerning the events can be divided into three major problems: existence, characterization and identity. Donald Davidson has engaged into all these three issues. His most important argument for the existence of the events possesses an ontological and semantic aspect. He argues that ordinary predicate logic fails to support the intuitional validity of the inference of the action sentences with less qualification (i.e., containing fewer amounts of adverbs) from those with more qualification. In order to remedy this deficiency we must paraphrase these sentences as ones containing quantification over specific actions (events) and this, according to Quine’s well-known criterion of ontological commitment leads to the existence of events. Davidson’s approach has been objected in several ways some of them are so serious that do not seem to leave much plausibility for his argument.

Keywords


  1. هاک، سوزان، (1382)، فلسفه منطق، ترجمۀ سید محمدعلی حجتی، قم، کتاب طه.
  2. Casati, Roberto and Varzi, Achille, (2010), "Events", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/events/>.
  3. Davidson, D., (1966), “The Logical Form of Action Sentences”, in N. Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action, University of Pitsburgh Press, Pitsburgh.
  4. Davidson, D., (1969), “The Individuation of Events” in Essays in Honour of Carl G. Hempel,  N. Rescher (ed.), Dordrecht, Springer.
  5. Kotarbinski, T., (1966), Gnosiology:The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, O. Wojtasiewicz (trs.), Oxford: Pergamon Press.
  6. Lombard, L. B., )1998(, ‘Ontologies of Events’, in S. Laurence and C. Macdonald (eds.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics, Oxford, Blackwell.
  7. Loux, M. J., (2006), Metaphysics: A contemporary introduction,Third edition, New York and Oxon, Routledge.
  8. Lowe, E. J. )2002(, A Survey of Metaphysics, New York, Oxford University Press.
  9. Pianesi, Fabio and Achille Varzi, (2000), “Events and Event Talk: An Introduction”, in Speaking of Events, James Higginbotham, Fabio Pianesi, and Achille C. Varzi (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–47.
  10. Quine, W. V., (1976), The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, second edition,Harvard University Press.
  11. Ramsey, F. P., (1927), Facts and Propositions, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 7: 153–170 reprinted in Ramsey, F. P., (1990), Philosophical Papers, D. H. Mellor (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 34-51.
  12. Ruse, Michael, (1995), “Reductionism”, in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Ted Honderich (ed.), Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  13. Russell, B., (1927), The Analysis of Matter, Keagan Paul, London.
  14. Russell, B., (1956), Logic and Knowledge,  Essays, 1901–1950,  R. C. Marsh (ed.), London, George Allen and Unwin.
  15. Schneider, S., (2005), “Events”, in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URL= <www.iep.utm.edu/events>
  16. Stanosz, B., (1998), "Tadeusz Kotarbinski" in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London and New York, Routledge.
  17. Strawson, P. F., (1959), Individuals, London, Methuen.
  18. Wartofsky, Marx W., (1979), Models: Representation and the Scientific Understanding, Dordrecht, Reidel Publishing Company.