عنوان مقاله [English]
The category of motion is one of the most important philosophical and scientific issues has been studied in philosophical ontology from Aristotle until now. Ibn Sina has also discussed movement and has proved movement in some accidental categories. But he is recognized as denier of substantial movement. Mulla Sadra also accepts the motion in all categories ,and while responding to the problems about substantial movement, for the first time in the history of philosophy, he proved the movement in essence by applying his ontological foundations.
This article answers the question of how necessity and impossibility can be gathered in one proposition. Why does Ibn Sina believe in impossibility of substantial movement and it is necessary for Mulla Sadra? By qualitative content analysis of both views, we have come to the conclusion that given the philosophical foundations and ontological presuppositions, there is an acknowledgment of the theory of substantial movement in the views of philosophers before Mulla Sadra, in particular IbnSina. But due to the intertwining of the discussion of transformation in quiddity with the movement in the existence or ambiguity in quality of substantial movement, there is a dualism between Ibn Sina's and Mulla Sadra's views. But given these two approaches and whether essential forms can safeguard the unity of the matter or not? We came to the conclusion that in Ibn Sina's view, substantial movement is possible, not impossible.