نظریه چهاربعدگرایی لوئیس و مسئله تغییر

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه دانشگاه تربیت مدرس

2 استاد فلسفه دانشگاه تربیت مدرس

چکیده

چهاربعدگرایی (در مقابل سه‏بعدگرایی)، دیدگاهی در متافیزیک معاصر است که به موجب آن، اشیای عادی، هویاتی چهاربعدیند که به واسطة داشتن اجزای زمانی متمایز در زمان‎های مختلف بقا دارند. یکی از اشکال عمدة این نظریه، مشهور به نظریه کرم‎های مکانی- زمانی که توسط دیوید لوئیس پیشنهاد شده است، مدلول اشیا را مجموع چهاربعدی اجزای زمانی می‎داند. لوئیس بر این عقیده است که چهاربعدگرایی، تنها راه‎حل قابل دفاع مسئله به اصطلاح اوصاف نفسی موقتی است و به نیکی در برابر اشکالات ممکن مختلف قابل دفاع است. نوشتار حاضر ضمن تأکید عمده بر این مسئله، قصد دارد نسخة چهاربعدگرایی لوئیس را مورد ارزیابی قرار دهد. بدین منظور، پس از معرفی این مسئله، راه‎حل مبتنی بر اجزای زمانیِ لوئیس مورد تبیین و بررسی قرار می‎گیرد. استنتاج ما این است که چهاربعدگرایی پیشنهادی لوئیس، افزون بر مشکلات آن در فراهم نمودن راهحلی مقبول برای مسئله تغییر نفسی و مسئله تغییر به طور عام، تبیینی غیرشهودی از بقا و مفاهیمی غیراستاندارد و ناآشنا از تغییر و اتصاف ارائه می­کند و در حفظ معنایی از وحدت که در مفهوم شیء بودن ضرورت دارد، ناموفق است.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Lewisian Four-Dimensionalism and the Problem of Change

نویسندگان [English]

  • tayebe shahverdian 1
  • Mohammad Saeedimehr 2
1 PhD student at Tarbiat Modares University of Tehran
2 - Professor of philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University
چکیده [English]

Four-dimensionalism (as opposed to three-dimensionalism) is a view in contemporary metaphysics according to which ordinary objects are identified as four-dimensional entities continue to exist through time by having distinct temporal parts at different times. This theory may be presented in various form and one major variant of it is known as space-time worm-theory or perdurantism, which is proposed by David Lewis.  This view takes the referent of the objects to be the four-dimensional sums of temporal parts. Lewis maintains that four-dimensionalism is the only tenable solution to the so-called problem of temporary intrinsic and can be well defended against different possible objections. Putting the main emphasis on this problem, the present paper aims to evaluate Lewisian version of four-dimensionalism. To do so, after introducing this problem, Lewisian temporal part-based solution to the problem will be stated and examined. We conclude that besides its problems in providing a viable solution to the problem of intrinsic change and the problem of change in general, four-dimensionalism proposed by Lewis renders a counterintuitive account of persistence and non-standard and unfamiliar notions of change and instantiation and fails to preserve the sense of unity which is crucial to the concept of being an object.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Four-Dimensionalism
  • David Lewis
  • The Problem of Temporary Intrinsic
  • Change
  • Persistence

Balashov, Yuri, (2000) Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time, Philosophical Studies, 99, pp 129–66. [In English]

------ (2007) Defining Exdurance, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 133, No. 1, pp143–9. [In English]

Benovsky, Jiri, (2011) Endurance, Perdurance and Metaontology, SATS, vol. 12,  pp 159–177. [In English]

Forrest, Peter, (2010) The Identity of Indiscernibles, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/2015/ entries/ The Identity of Indiscernibles />. [In English]

Gallois, Andre, (2016) Identity over Time, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/identity-time/>. [In English]

Hales, Steven D. and Johnson, Timothy A., (2003) Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol.53, no. 213, pp 524-539. [In English]

Haslanger, Sally, (1989) Endurantism and Temporary Intrinsics, Analysis, 49:30, pp119-125. [In English]

------, (2005) Persistencethrough Time, in Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (Ed.), Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, New York: Oxford University Press, pp 315-354. [In English]

Hawley, Katherine, (2001) How Things Persist, Oxford:Clarendon Press. [In English]

 ------, (2015) Temporal Parts, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (2015), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/2015/entries/ Temporal Parts/>. [In English]

Heller, Mark, (1984) Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects, An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Nov., 1984), pp 323-334. [In English]

Johnston, Mark, (1987) Is There a Problem about Persistence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 61, pp107-135. [In English]

Lewis, David, (1976a) Survival and Identity, in Amelie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp 117–40. [In English]

------, (1976b) The paradoxes of time travel, reprinted in Van Inwagen, Peter and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), (1998), Metaphysics, The Big Questions, Oxford: Blackwell, pp 159-169. [In English]

------, (1983) Extrinsic Properties, reprinted in (1999) Papers in Metaphysicsand Epistemology, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp 111-115. [In English]

------, (1986) On Plurality of the Worlds, Oxford, Blackwell. [In English]

------, (1988) Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe, reprinted in (1999), Papers in Metaphysicsand Epistemology, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp 187-95. [In English]

------, (1993) Many, But Almost One, reprinted in (1999) Papers in Metaphysicsand Epistemology, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp 164-182. [In English]

------, (2002) Tensing the Copula, Mind, Vol. 111, No. 441, pp 1-13. [In English]

------, (2003) Postscript to Survival and Identity, in his Philosophical Papers, vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 73-77. [In English]

Lombard, Lawrence Brian, (1994) The Doctrine of Temporal Parts and No-Change Objection, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp 365-372. [In English]

Loux, Michael J, (2006) Metaphysics, A Contemporary Introduction, New York: Routledge. [In English]

Lowe, A. J, (2002) A Survey of Metaphysics, New York: Oxford University Press. [In English]

Merricks, Trenton, (1994) Endurance and Indiscernibility, Journal of Philosophy, 91, pp165–84. [In English]

Noonan, Harold & Curtis, Ben (2014) Identity, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/2014/ entries/Identity. [In English]

Rea, Michael C, (2005) Four-Dimensionalism, in Loux, Michael J. and Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 246-280. [In English]

Robertson, Teresa and Atkins, Philip, (2018) Essential vs. Accidental Properties, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/essential-ccidental/>. [In English]

Sider, Theodore, (1996) All the World’s a Stage, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, pp 433–453. [In English]

------, (1997) Four-Dimensionalism, Philosophical Review, 106, pp 197–231. [In English]

------, (2000) The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsics, Analysis, 60, pp 84–88. [In English]

------, (2001) Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time, New York: Oxford University Press. [In English]

Van Inwagen, Peter, (1990) Four-Dimensional Objects, NOUS, 24, pp 245-255. [In English]