عنوان مقاله [English]
Concept of being, by most of MullaSadra’s predecessors, considered simply to be as a derivative and secondary intelligible, to which could not be ascribed any concrete objects or properties, as the referents. The specific problem that we want to address is that if one accepts fundamentality of existence, then how the concept of existence would relate to being (wujūd) itself. In fact, there is an affinity between primacy of being and the way in which concept of being signify things in real world, namely the criterion of subsuming it under first or second intelligible classes. We will argue that rendering the concept of being as a secondary intelligible is inconsistent with MullaSadra’s account of being, based on two different definitions presented traditionally for first and secondary intentions, and the concept, in the sense which characterized by MullaSadra should be subsumed as first intelligible. By exploring the elements of fundamentality of being, one admits that Primacy of being results in the fact that concept of being belongs to first intelligible class.