‌منظر اول شخص قوی؛ معیار هویت شخصی از دیدگاه لین رادر بیکر

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه تطبیقی دانشگاه قم

2 استاد تمام گروه فلسفه و کلام دانشگاه قم

3 استاد تمام گروه فلسفه اخلاق دانشگاه قم

10.22061/orj.2023.1839

چکیده

فیلسوفان ذهن، براساس رویکردهای گوناگون در مسئله ذهن، درباره هویت شخصی، «شخص» یا «من» معیارهای متفاوتی مطرح کرده‌اند. یکی از این معیارها داشتن منظر اول شخص است. یکی از طرفداران این  دیدگاه، لین رادر بیکر، فیلسوف فیزیکالیست غیرتقلیل‌گرا است که در عین حال که هویت انسان را نه نفس مجرد می‌داند و نه تحویل آن به جنبه‌های فیزیکی را برمی‌تابد، داشتن منظر اول شخص قوی را شرط لازم و کافی برای شخص بودن می‌داند. منظر اول شخص قوی به معنای توانایی درک خود به عنوان خود به صورت اول شخص و بدون استفاده از هر اسم و توصیف یا همان خودآگاهی است که شخص انسان را از دیگر موجودات متمایز می‌کند. در مقابل، منظر اول شخص ضعیف قرار دارد که ویژه موجوداتی است که علی‌رغم داشتن آگاهی از ویژگی خوداگاهی بی‌بهره‌اند. مقاله حاضر با روش تحلیلی-انتقادی ضمن تحلیل بیکر در باب منظر اول شخص، دیدگاه او را ارزیابی و نقد کرده است. ابهام در ماهیت منظر اول شخص و شخص بودن، فقدان استدلال برای برخی ادعاها و فقدان وضوح در بعضی از پیش‌شرط‌ها و پیش‌فرض‌های آن از جمله نقدهایی است که مقبولیت و انسجام دیدگاه بیکر را با مشکل مواجه کرده است.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Robust First-Person Perspective: the Criterion of Human Personality from the Lynne Rudder Baker's Point of View

نویسندگان [English]

  • Reza Bazeli 1
  • Zahra Khazaei 2
  • Mohsen Javadi 3
1 PhD student of comparative philosophy, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
2 Professor of Comparative Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Islamic Theology, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
3 Professor of Philosophy, Department of Ethics, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.
چکیده [English]

Philosophers of the mind, based on various approaches to the problem of the mind, have proposed different criteria about human personality, "person" or "I". One of these criteria is having a first-person perspective. One of the proponents of this criteria is Lynne Rudder Baker, a non-reductionist materialist philosopher who considers human personality neither as an immaterial soul nor as reducing it over to physical things. According to her, a robust first-person perspective is sufficient and necessary condition for being a person. A being is a person if and only if it has the capacity for a first-person perspective. The robust first-person perspective is the ability to conceive of oneself as oneself, without the use of any name or description. It is same self-consciousness that distinguishes a person from other beings. In contrast, there is a rudimentary first-person perspective, which is specific to beings who, despite having consciousness, lack the self-consciousness feature. The present article has evaluated and criticized the Baker's point of view on first-person perspective with analytical and critical methodology. Ambiguity in the nature of the first-person perspective and being a person, an absence of argument for some claims and lack adequately clarity on some preconditions and presuppositions are some criticisms that were propounded ‌on the acceptability and coherence of Baker's view.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Person
  • Human Personality
  • Self-Consciousness
  • Robust First-Person Perspective
  • Rudimentary First-Person Perspective
  • Lynne Rudder Baker

مراجع

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پژوهش های هستی شناختی
دوره 11، شماره 22
اسفند 1401
صفحه 428-399

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