Ontological Analysis of Concrete Particulars: Bundle Theory and Categorical Aristotelian Substance Theory

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Abstract
The ontological analysis of concrete particulars deals with the relationship between concrete object and their attributes. Both Peter Simons' Nuclear Theory and Aristotelian Substance Theory may present an acceptable explanation for the following three problems: Identity of Indiscernible, Excessive Necessitism and Change. In spite of the superiority of these two theories over the other theories, each has problems need to be addressed. Aristotelian theory does not seem to be very successful in showing that the spices (kinds) are unchangeable or at least does not explain it. Simmons's theory also returns to Aristotelian theory. While outlining the challenges to any theory, the final suggestion of the paper is that with inspiration of Simmons' theory and introducing a relation between the generalities (universal Whatness), create a modification in Aristotelian theory to overcome the challenge of the irreductive challenge of Species (kinds) Simons' theory, in some sense, collapses back to Aristotelian Theory.

Keywords: Aristotelian Substance, Nuclear Theory, Ontological Analysis of Concrete Objects, Analytic Metaphysics.
Problem Statement
The ontological analysis of concrete particular objects considers the relationship between concrete objects and their attributes. We also try to identify the nature of the constituents that play essential role for objects and the relationship between them.

In order to answer these questions, we face three significant theories: Bundle Theory, Substratum Theory, and Aristotelian Substance Theory. According to Bundle’s Theory concrete objects are the result of constructions from properties and attributes are considered as the only constituents for the objects. In Substratum Theory, substratum, in addition to properties are constituents. The substratum carries properties. Despite to these two theories, Aristotelian Substance Theory considers an object as an instance of a kind that is irreducible to properties.

Discussion in this paper is confined to these theories: Aristotelian Substance Theory and Nuclear Theory. Peter Simons' Nuclear Theory is one of the Bundle Theory versions. The writers think that both theories are plausible or at least considerable in this subject.

The main issue to be addressed and responded in this paper is that which theory is more acceptable and plausible. Although both theories have some advantages with respect to other theories, but it seems that they failed and are suffering from some challenges. Aristotelian Theory should prove that kinds are irreducible to properties. Simons’ theory should explain the cause of setting a property in an inner core or an outer fringe.

Method
In this research, we use analytic method. First, both theories are described and then some critiques are pointed out. Responses to every critique are reconstructed as valid arguments. Finally, every argument is evaluated.

Findings and Results
The argument from instantiation can't prove the categorical distinction among universal properties and kinds. The supposition that every particular has to exemplify only an instance of one universal, leads to this conclusion that substantial individuals should be an instance of a kind. So, every substantial individual is distinct from individual property or modes.

Thus, the distinction between the individual and the states (attributes) is the basis of the distinction between categorical kind and characteristics. The aim of illustrating the distinction between categorical kinds and general features is to prove the distinction between substantial individuals and universal properties.

Here the distinction between substantial individuals and states (attributes) are presupposed and it is the basis for proving the distinction between categorical kinds and the universal qualities. On the basis argument from whatness (what-question) and argument from howness (How-question) kinds and attributes are categorically distinguished; because, "how properties" can't reveal the object's identity, while kinds have such ability. It is logically acceptable that "how properties" are posteriori to kinds that they objectify them. But, it is difficult to accept such posteriority for whatness properties.

It seems that universal whatness is reducible objects. For example, human being can be analyzed as a set of properties such as rational, living, moving by will. Not only Socrates instantiate human being universal, but also instantiate animal universal and we can't say he exemplify animal universal. All these properties determine the identity of the object and they are its constituent.

By such suggestion we may consider a kind as a unified, irreducible identification, as Simons divide an object into two bundles. The what properties are the sole constituents of bundle properties. Now we can introduce a relationship between universal whatness exactly or approximately like R. Assuming R lead to accept kinds are irreducible.
References


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