A Critical Investigation on Per Se Existence and Per Accident Existence in Transcendent Philosophy: With Emphasizing on Javadi Amoli`s View

Gholamreza Shameli\textsuperscript{1}
Ghasem Kakaie\textsuperscript{2}
Mohammad Bonyani\textsuperscript{3}

Abstract
Existence is divided into various divisions by Muslim philosophers. Existence in itself (per se) and existence in something else (Per Accident) are considered a significant categorization on existence. This division on existence is phrased by Mulla Sadra as Rabet existence (Connective being) and independent existence (self-subsistent being). The next philosophers especially Hajj Molla Hadi Sabzavari and Allameh Tabatabaei decided to unite them. Such unification fails to be successful and makes some difficulties like joining quiddity to concepts in addition to it, many of the philosophical foundations that are in some way related to quiddity are rejected. The aim in this paper is to attempt for presenting an accurate analysis of self-subsistent existence and connective being and combine these two divisions in a consistent way. It makes some difficulties such joining quiddity to concepts and many of the philosophical foundations that are in some way related to quiddity are rejected. In this article, we try to make an accurate analysis of self-subsistent existence and connective being and combine these two divisions in a consistent way.

Keywords: Per Se Existence, Self-Subsistent Existence, Quiddity, Connective Being.

\textsuperscript{1}- PHD student at Shiraz university- Faculty of Theology and knowledeg- corresponding author
\textsuperscript{2}- PHD professor at shiraz university
\textsuperscript{3}- PHD associate professor at shiraz university
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Department of Islamic philosophy,
shameli1388@gmail.com
gkakaie@rose.shirazu.ac.ir
m.bonyani@gmail.com
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Problem Statement
After Mulla Sadra, philosophers faced challenges in explaining his ideas. The most important reason is that some of them interpret transcendental wisdom in accordance with the Peripatetic school or mystical school in Muslim society. But in order to reach to a correct interpretation of the transcendental wisdom, we must rely upon the principles of transcendental wisdom itself. There are some challenges about divisions on existence. Does Mulla Sadra's Two-sided dividing eventually lead to joining quiddity to concepts? Is the famous division of philosophers about existence division into self-subsistent existence and existence not in itself adapt with the division of Mulla Sadra into "copulative" and "independent" existence? Can we offer another account that does not suffer the aforementioned challenges, but it combines the view available to philosophers before Mulla Sadra and Sadra's view?

Method
This paper is conducted in a logical and analytical method based on Sadra's works and his commentator's works.

Findings and Results
The findings of this research are based on three axes:
A. adaption of Mullah Sadra's two-side division by multi-side philosopher’s division in an inaccurate analysis.

In order to be able to integrate the philosopher’s division into Mulla Sadra's division, we must change in the structure of the philosopher’s division by himself in itself for itself Existence not by himself in something else not for it self.

The "in itself by himself" existence is equally "independent" in Mulla Sadra's division.
The "in itself not by himself" existence, whether it is for itself, or in something else is equal to "copulative".

However, there are still some problems for this division. Apparently, in the two-side divisions between different types of copulative existence is not any difference; therefore, some believe that if the creatures are all copulative, then they lack of essence and quiddity. That means the quiddity are joining the concepts; therefore, subjects such as substantial motion, etc., which are related to the essence, accident and quiddity, can't be explained.

B. A detailed analysis of the multi-side division of existence based on "basicality of being" and the adaptation of Mullah Sadra's two-side division with that.

The second aspect, requires an analysis of the type of copula proposition existence, accidents and substances.

substances only have self-subsistent existence and therefore for creation don’t have need to object. But the accidents, in addition to "in itself", have also "in something else" existence; the reason that the predicate can be linked to the subject is the same thing. Getting "not for itself" in its definition shows an Intense weakness of the predicate, and because of its Intense existential weakness, it requires a copula that connects the predicate to the subject.
The copula proposition existence is so weak in its existence that it requires the two sides, and the abstraction of the quiddity of it is impossible because there is no in-itself, and its relation is predicamental.

Other creatures have "in itself" existence. The difference between self-subsistent of accidents and self-subsistent of substances is in their intensity and weakness.

So the "existence in itself by itself" is "Independent", and the others, including substances and accidents, are all "copulative". The difference between "copulative existence" and "copula proposition" is that its relation is illuminative, and it can be abstracted quiddity from that.

C. The rejection of the "joining quiddity to concepts" theory based on the detailed analysis of multi-side division and the presentation of a new division of existence that does not have the challenges of the previous divisions.

Some philosophers consider the "in itself existence" as "excluding condition" and ascribe "existence" only to God. Also, they say that there is no difference between the various meanings of copulative existence and, all beings except necessary existence are "in something else" and copulative and lacking essence, and therefore lacking quiddity.

But if we consider the existence in the form of "including condition", we will not be in that challenges. So we can say that the existence is either "in itself" (independent) or "not in itself". The "in itself" existence is essential or inessential. Therefore, God is an independent existence through his essence, the copulative existence has an inessential independence that can be abstracted quiddity from it, and the copula proposition is "not in itself" existence, which in general lacks essence and quiddity.

With this analysis, the challenge of "joining quiddity to concepts" is eliminated.

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